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Svensk sammanfattning
I denna avhandling analyserar jag både offentliga och privata företag och
organisationer, inklusive universitet, särskilt när det existerar potentiell
inre motivation. Jag behandlar både industriell produktion, inklusive
infrastruktursektorer med vertikala relationer, och tjänstesektorn.
Man tänker sig att ägandet kan påverka kostnadseffektiviteten dels
genom olika storlek hos lönetillägg och andra förmåner för de anställda
(eng. Internal Rent Capture), och dels via asymmetrisk information. Jag
frågar dessutom om det finns andra faktorer än ägande och konkurrens
som kan påverka prestandan hos kommersiella företag och ideella
organisationer.
Dessa frågeställningar aktualiseras av pågående reformer inom den
offentliga sektorn, särskilt i samband med den så kallade nya offentliga
förvaltningen (eng. New Public Management). Jag analyserar reformer-
nas inverkan på hur bra en organisation fungerar och på den sociala
välfärden. Analysen i denna avhandling är teoretisk, men resultaten är
relaterade också till den empiriska litteraturen.
Avhandlingen är uppdelad i del I och II. I del I sammanfattar jag av-
handlingen och sätter den i ett sammanhang, medan del II består av fem
redan publicerade essäer. De två första (I–II) är mera traditionella, i och
med att de baserar sig på homo economicus (eng. the economic man), utan
att beakta den inre motivationen. I essä I (publicerad 2008) bedömer
vi fördelar och nackdelar av privatisering och avreglering innanför en
sådan ram, men med en betoning också på icke återvinningsbara fasta
kostnader och vertikala relationer. I essä II (publicerad 2012) fokuserar
vi oss på vertikal separation, och konkurrensutsättning och privatisering
i nätverksindustrier.
I essäerna III–V vidgas perspektivet genom att införa potentiell
inre motivation i en agentmodell. Analysen i essä III (publicerad 2014)
tillämpas på offentligt ägande och privatisering. I essäerna IV och V
(publicerade 2009 respektive 2013) utvidgas analysen till att även gälla
kreativa branscher, särskilt arbete inom universiteten, där den inre
motivationen hos de anställda kan tänkas vara avgörande. I dessa essäer
tillämpas en analys som inbegriper ett intra-personellt spel inom ramen
för en agentmodell med potentiell inre motivation. Vi analyserar sålunda
avvägningen mellan ekonomiska incitament och inre motivation.
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Uprising
Paranoia is in bloom,
the P.R. transmissions will resume,
they’ll try to push drugs that keep us all dumbed down
and hope that we will never see the truth around.
(So come on.)
Another promise, another seed,
another packaged lie to keep us trapped in greed,
and all the green belts wrapped around our minds
and endless red tape to keep the truth confined.
(So come on.)
They will not force us,
they will stop degrading us.
They will not control us,
we will be victorious.
(So come on.)
Interchanging mind control,
come let the revolution takes its toll,
if you could flick the switch and open your third eye,
you’d see that we should never be afraid to die.
(So come on.)
Rise up and take the power back,
it’s time the fat cats had a heart attack,
they know that their time’s coming to an end,
we have to unify and watch our flag ascend.
(So come on.)
They will not force us,
they will stop degrading us.
They will not control us,
we will be victorious.
. . .
Matthew Bellamy
The Resistance (2009)
3
i
i
“avhandlingen” — 2014/9/16 — 15:48 — page 4 — #14 i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
“avhandlingen” — 2014/9/16 — 15:48 — page 5 — #15 i
i
i
i
i
i
1 Introduction
In this dissertation I analyse private and public-sector firms and organ-
isations, including universities, in particular in the presence of potential
intrinsic motivation. I deal with both industrial production, including
infrastructure industries with vertical relations, and service provision,
and in particular in the case of universities. Costs may differ across firms
or organisations in both types of industries because of, for example,
internal rent capture and agency problems. I also ask whether there are
other factors than ownership and competition, such as the approach to
employee motivation that may affect the performance of commercial
firms and non-profit organisations.
When it comes to public services, I also analyse the rationale behind
public-sector reforms and the impact of these reforms on organisational
performance and social welfare, with an emphasis on the so called
New Public Management. I deliberately use and amend models with
standard components such as Cournot oligopoly, Nash bargaining and
constant absolute risk aversion.
The dissertation is divided into parts I and II. Part I is a research
summary with an introductory background, whereas part II consists of
five previously published essays. The two first essays (I–II) are more
traditional, by being based on homo economicus (eng. the economic man)
and hence ignoring intrinsic motivation. Essay I (2008) assesses the
merits of privatisation and liberalisation in such a framework, but with
an emphasis also on sunk costs and vertical relations as well. Essay II
(2012) analyses vertical relations in network industries and the welfare
effects of such reforms that require vertical separation.
The analysis in essays III–V transcends the framework of the two
first essays by including intrinsic motivation. Essay III (2014) adds
potential intrinsic motivation to an agency model that is applied on
public ownership and privatisation. Thus, the common denominator
in essays I–III is an analysis of the cost and welfare impact of privat-
isation and liberalisation, primarily with industrial production and
infrastructure industries in mind.
In essays IV (2009) and V (2013), the analysis is extended so as to
apply to creative industries, in particular to universities and academic
work (although the analysis might be applicable on a number of other
5
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public and private agencies as well). Employee motivation is then
crucial. These essays apply an internal-game approach to principal-
agent analysis with potential intrinsic motivation. We then analyse the
tradeoff between economic incentives and intrinsic motivation.
This research summary focuses on the common denominators of
essays I–V by starting in section 2 with a presentation of the background
of my research topics. Here I especially discuss privatisation and the
reasons for privatising, also in the case of vertical relations and natural
monopolies.
Section 3 consists of a theoretical discussion of creative industries
and possible reasons for cost and performance differences. In section
4 I summarise the previous literature and discuss various aspects of
intrinsic motivation. The phenomenon of motivation crowding out,
including some of its potential causes, is also addressed. I relate these
findings to the empirical literature as well.
In section 5 I introduce the essays of part II by summarising each of
them, and by setting them into context. The last section (6) concludes the
research summary, with a final paragraph that presents some thoughts
on future research.
6
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2 Background
2.1 Privatisation and other public-sector reforms
Public ownership, regulation and privatisation
By privatisation I mean the sale of the entire organisation, or at least of
the majority of its shares. However, Matsumura (1998) among others,
defines privatisation in terms of behaviour and objectives. Matsumura
treats the weight for profits in the objective function as equivalent
to the proportion of the shares that are owned by private investors
(Matsumura, 1998). However, profits can appear in a firm’s objective
function also without partial privatisation, whereas many completely
private firms and organisations may have wider objectives than profit
maximisation. In the essays of this dissertation privatisation means a
transition from public to private ownership. We do not consider mixed
oligopolies or privatisation in the form of outsourced services.
Natural monopoly industries in the US have usually been private
and regulated rather than owned by the public sector, whereas such
industries in Europe used to be nationalised (see for example Björkroth,
Grönblom, and Willner, 2006). The rationale for public ownership has
traditionally been the existence of market failures. For example, some
industries such as telecommunications, electricity, railways, gas, and
water, are or have been natural monopolies (see for example Newbery,
2001; Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner, 2006).
When it comes to utilities that are associated with sunk costs and
require a network infrastructure, the upstream activity is usually a
natural monopoly. Public ownership or alternatively regulation may
therefore ensure that there is a sufficient amount of investments and
maintenance. The state then sets the rules for the network utilities,
either by regulation or by owning the company (Newbery, 2001).
7
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Vertical integration and liberalisation
In what fallows liberalisation means replacing a monopoly by competi-
tion in the form of Cournot oligopoly without regulation.1 Nowadays
the European approach is to introduce competition even in vertically
integrated network industries, by enforcing vertical separation, which
is a precondition for competition. The natural monopoly in such a
situation has to be isolated from the downstream activity as a separate
infrastructure company. The rest of the activities are then to be opened
up to competition, sometimes through privatisation with regulation
(Florio, 2013; Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner, 2006; Parker, 2003).
Kay and Thompson (1986) admit in a critical essay on privatisation
that scope exists for introducing competition in industries traditionally
regarded as natural monopolies2. Buehler (2005) on the other hand
finds that vertically separating an integrated network industry is likely
to increase retail prices because of double marginalisation i.e. profit
margins both upstream and downstream. Such a restructuring may not
only increase retail prices, but may also lead to lower investments in
cost reduction, and hence to adverse welfare effects (Buehler, 2005).
In, for example, Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner (2006) we have
compared privatisation and liberalisation in industries such as telecom-
munications, electricity, water and public transport in Europe3. We find
that public ownership does not appear to be less cost efficient at least
when it comes to utilities such as water and electricity. Telecommunica-
tions are often seen as a more successful example of liberalisation than
electricity and especially railways. However, some established publicly
owned incumbents have been technically progressive in themselves, so
significant cost reductions even without a reform cannot be ruled out
(see for example Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner, 2006; Björkroth,
2003)4.
When it comes to electricity, there have also been concerns both about
excessive market power and such fragmentation that may jeopardise
system reliability and the benefits of vertical integration (see for example
1However, liberalisation can in practice mean stricter regulation as when for example a
welfare-maximising monopoly is replaced by competition between profit-maximisers
that must be monitored.
2In their analysis competition could be introduced in particular through franchising.
3I am not comparing reforms of different industries from different part of the world
in this dissertation. For overviews see for example Parker (2003) and Florio (2013)
on the EU, Boardman, Laurin, and Vining (2003) and Crew and Kleindorfer (2003)
on the North America, and Hodge (2003) on Australia.
4The performance improvement occurred before privatisation in the water industry as
well (see for example Shaoul, 1997)
8
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Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner, 2006). In the railway industry, a series
of accidents in the UK have raised questions about proper maintenance
and coordination (Newbery, 2001). In bus transport, costs have been
reduced, but partly at the expense of staff and in some countries also by
reducing the quality of the service (Willner, 2006, 2003).
In Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner (2006) we also suggest that a
liberalisation of, for example, the electricity market can lead to either
disadvantages related to vertical disintegration, diseconomies of scale
and reliability, consolidation, or a combination of these. Consolidation
can raise prices and hand over strategic decisions to a limited number of
very large companies (Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner, 2006). Vertical
foreclosure might not be profitable from the integrated firm’s point
of view either. This is because the integrated firm may find it more
profitable to divert the competitor’s demand by lowering its retail price
rather than raising the competitor’s access charge, even if the access
prices would not be regulated (Buehler, 2005).
Vickers (1995) finds that vertical integration in the presence of im-
perfect information and imperfect competition makes the regulator’s
task harder if the upstream monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to
raise rivals’ costs. However, it is well known that vertical integration has
advantages as well. Vickers (1995) argues for example that integration
may lead to fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplic-
ation of fixed costs. The overall welfare comparison between separation
and integration can therefore in the end remain ambiguous (Vickers,
1995).
However, essay II (Willner and Grönblom, 2012), which deals with
vertical relations, competition and privatisation addresses this issue. We
apply a principal-agent analysis on cost efficiency and welfare. We find
that the popular notion that competition through vertical separation has
cost advantages and welfare effects that overshadow the advantages of
vertical integration is in general not true in such a setting. Moreover,
in essay I (Grönblom and Willner, 2008), we find that the same applies
when cost differences are caused by internal rent capture.
Competition
It is well known that a combination of privatisation and liberalisation
can improve welfare, provided that costs are reduced. Liberalisation is
therefore inspired by the notion that perfect competition would be su-
perior even to a welfare-maximising public monopoly because of lower
costs (Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner, 2006; Willner, 2003; Robinson,
2003). Insofar as efficiency gains are primarily caused by competition,
9
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privatisation can, however, be seen as a part of a liberalisation process,
rather than an end in itself (Newbery, 2001). However, free entry can
also lead to social costs related to unnecessary duplication in the pres-
ence of high sunk costs, which would mean that too many firms will in
fact enter (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986).
Parker (2006) finds that changes in ownership lead to improvements
in performance in the presence of appropriate changes in the com-
petitive or regulatory environments. He argues that competition (or
effective state regulation) is important if privatisation is to lead to per-
formance improvements, including lower productions costs and prices
and improved services. That is, ownership changes do not appear to
have significant effect in improving economic performance, especially in
terms of welfare gains to consumers (Parker, 2006). Improvements after
privatisation might then have been caused by competition rather than
by ownership (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Parker, 2006; Borcherding,
Pommerehne, and Schneider, 1982).
In Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner (2006) we address the fun-
damental question of when competition in a market is preferable to
a public monopoly when all firms have sunk costs. We identify the
magnitude of the cost savings that are necessary for competition to be
superior, and we address this also in the presence of network extern-
alities (Björkroth, Grönblom, and Willner, 2006). In essay I (Grönblom
and Willner, 2008), we analyse these issues in a model when there
is also wage-bargaining, which can give rise to internal rent capture,
and compare the market situation before and after liberalisation and
privatisation in the presence of sunk costs and vertical integration.
2.2 Reasons for privatising
The perceived justification for privatising is that public ownership is
believed to be more expensive, in particular when it comes to traditional
public-sector activities, because of for example soft budget constraints,
and lack of sticks and carrots (Dixit, 1997). It has also been argued
that privatisation might increase the quality of goods and services, but
this has taken place in general when public production is underfunded.
This suggests that some problems that occurred before privatisation,
such as underinvestments in the British water industry, might have been
addressed also without privatisation (Saal and Parker, 2000)5.
5The quality improvement could be possible for example if a quality improvement in
one output reduces the cost of producing another, i.e. some sort of a ”quality-driven
scope economy” (Saal and Parker, 2000).
10
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State-owned companies and public utilities have been privatised
for different reasons, for example in order to obtain sales revenues, to
achieve popular capitalism, or as part of a modernisation process (see for
example Parker, 2009). The predominant motive amongst economists
has however been the belief that public ownership is less cost efficient.
Parker (2009) challenges this notion. He argues that the motive among
decision-makers was more about obtaining sales revenue, despite their
rhetoric of efficiency gains. In for, example, the UK, the most efficient
companies were the first to be sold (Parker, 2009). Thus, the belief that
policy-makers have always strived for efficiency seems to be exaggerated.
From an economist’s point of view however, increased costs efficiency
is usually a necessary but not sufficient condition for privatisation to be
beneficial.
Willner (2006) in turn finds no systematic improvements after privat-
isation in Finland. Moreover, private ownership can lead to underpro-
vision (Willner, 2001). This is because western state-owned firms have
typically operated in imperfectly competitive markets, and sometimes
even in natural monopolies. The social costs of imperfect competition
can then in fact dominate also after privatisation even if production
costs are reduced (Willner, 2003, 1996)6.
The impact of ownership on cost efficiency
When it comes to the impact of ownership on costs, Megginson and
Netter (2001) summarise the empirical literature as favouring private
ownership. An earlier overview by Borcherding, Pommerehne, and
Schneider (1982) compare the efficiency of private and public production
in five countries (USA, Germany, Australia, Canada and Switzerland).
They find that private production tended to yield higher cost efficiency.
However, they also find that there were no significant differences in
unit cost if there was sufficient competition and neither discriminative
regulations nor subsidies.
Other extensive studies about the effects of privatisation on cost
efficiency are presented by for example Martin and Parker (1997); Florio
(2006) and Parker (2006), who analysed the UK privatisation situation,
and Hodge (2000), who made an international survey. They have shown,
also empirically, that privatisation does not always improve an organ-
isation’s cost efficiency, or even financial performance.
Another overview by Millward (1982) finds no broad support for
the superiority of either form of ownership, but Millward found that
6Political interference may be beneficial even in a seemingly perfect market if effort
affects utility (Willner, 2001).
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unit costs in some industries were lower in private firms, whereas the
reverse was true in other industries. Millward did not, however, find
support for lower managerial efficiency in public firms (Millward, 1982).
The overview by Boyd (1986) gives a similar impression. Differences in
the efficiency between firms in public and private ownership go both
ways, and cost efficiency does not necessarily depend on ownership
(Boyd, 1986).
These studies might suggest that the reason for the observed differ-
ences in cost efficiency might be explained by other facts than owner-
ship. However, there are still questions that have remained unanswered.
Could there be other factors than ownership or competition that might
affect the performance of commercial and non-profit organisations?
What impact have privatisation, liberalisation and vertical separation on
costs and welfare, in a principal-agent framework or in the presence of
sunk costs?
We address these questions in essays I–III (Grönblom and Willner,
2008; Willner and Grönblom, 2012; Grönblom and Willner, 2014). The
cost-differences in essay I are caused by endogenous internal rent cap-
ture through wage-bargaining with and without vertical integration.
There are vertical integration and endogenous cost-differences through
a principal-agent problem in essay II. In essay III on the other hand
we try to answer these questions by modifying the agency problem by
including intrinsic motivation.
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3 Theoretical discussion and
conceptual framework
3.1 Potential reasons for cost differences
Internal rent capture
Such profits that are explained by imperfect competition are often
referred to as rents. Internal rent capture (IRC) is caused by successful
”rent-seeking” within an organisation and stands for that part of the
rents that are captured by other stakeholders within the firms, in general
by the employees (Bradburd, Pugel, and Pugh, 1991).
The presence of IRC then implies a challenge to the efficiency com-
parisons, because it can raise the costs in the case of a public monopoly
even if the price-cost margin is zero. Such rents cause a dead-weight
loss in the same way as price-cost margins, but the excess wages or
benefits are not part of the dead-weight loss but part of the total surplus.
Suppose that there are no other sources of cost differences than IRC.
The measure of the social benefits of privatisation and liberalisation can
then be smaller than usually believed (see for example Willner, 1996).
We develop this idea further in essay I where we use a standard Nash
bargaining model for analysing IRC. (Grönblom and Willner, 2008).
Workers can benefit from IRC not only because of explicit wage-
bargaining, but also because of efficiency wages. This happens for
example when the employer wishes to achieve low labour turnover
rates, maintain work morale and motivation, or discourage workers
from shirking. The employer can also pay higher wages in order to
prevent unionisation (Bradburd, Pugel, and Pugh, 1991). Also, the size
of the mark-ups depends on the bargaining power of the union (Haskel
and Szymanski, 1993)7.
It is, however, not necessarily the case that the public sector or state-
owned firms would by default be more generous to their employees.
7IRC and fat-cat salaries in the form of post-privatisation efficiency wages when
intrinsic motivation is crowded out (see essay III: Grönblom and Willner, 2014),
may be difficult to distinguish. In what follows we use the term IRC only when
there is wage-bargaining.
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Econometric studies have provided contradictory results. For example
Adamchik and Bedi (2000) and Dustmann and Soest (1998) find that
wages are higher in the private sector while, for example, Mueller (1998)
and Christofides and Pashardes (2002) find that IRC is higher within the
public sector in Canada and Cyprus respectively. Blackaby, Murphy, and
O’Leary (1999) find that any rent differences are small and higher for
women than for men in the public sector. The public sector pays more
generously in the lower tail of the wage distribution, while the opposite
is true in the higher end, as also in Mueller (1998). As will be presented
in essay I (Grönblom and Willner, 2008), public-sector generosity would
not as such mean lower allocative efficiency, unless the differences in
salaries and fringe benefits are large enough to overshadow the profits
that would be gained after privatisation.
The principal-agent problem
Economists often build up models according to a simplified picture
of economic behaviour. Individuals are assumed to maximise their
utility and firms to maximise their profit. Such models have their
limitations, but they have nevertheless contributed to our understanding
of consumer behaviour, demand in different markets, or markets with
only limited competition8.
When it comes to managers, Williamson argues that managers
(agents) maximise utility and not profits (Williamson, 1963). This is
possible because of the separation of ownership and control. The agent
can then use discretion to maximise utility rather than to act in the
interests of the shareholders (and subject to a constraint that profits
should reach a minimum level). This kind of discretionary behaviour or
managerial slack is essential for the principal-agent problem (Williamson,
1963). As for policy makers, a similar argument suggests that they are
only interested in being re-elected.
Privatisation and other public-sector reforms have often been inspired
by agency theory and public-choice. Therefore, it is paradoxical that
the public sector will actually become more efficient if we assume that
the managers are just lazy and greedy (like all economic agents), as in
the agency theory. The explanation is that wider objectives (as usually
assumed in the case of public ownership) means a stronger incentive to
pay such an agent for reductions in managerial slack (De Fraja, 1993).
8Some economists however have pushed such reasoning to its extreme by applying
them to all areas of life, such as spouse selection, prostitution and sports, or the
behaviour in politics and administration (see for example McKenzie and Tullock,
2012).
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I take Raith (2003)’s version of an agency model as a point of de-
parture in the technical analysis found in Essays II–IV (Willner and
Grönblom, 2012; Grönblom and Willner, 2014; Willner and Grönblom,
2009). This standard model is based on normally distributed shocks,
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and a linear reward system (see
also Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). This means that we use a function
of the expected value and variance of the wage instead of the director’s
or the agent’s original utility function (for more details see Grönblom
and Willner, 2013, pp 4–5). The principal-agent problem is ignored in
essay I (Grönblom and Willner, 2008) but is present in the other essays.
Criticism against the economic man
The traditional principal-agent theory states that the agent should be
compensated for the disutility of effort. The assumption is then that the
agent does not get any benefit at all from performing tasks given by the
employer. However, many authors, such as Frey (1997) have argued that
individuals have more complex motives than what the principal-agent
theory assumes.
Alger and Weibull (2013) give one explanation why individuals
might have more complex motives than homo economicus. They show
that there may be other factors than selfishness that drives a human
being, for instance morality and a sense of doing what is right. An other
extension is based on social preferences. These matter according to Fehr
and Fischbacher (2002), who have conducted an experimental study;
economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions if they
ignore social preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).
Other research results that suggest a need of a re-examination of tra-
ditional assumptions are related to the homo ludens payoff (also referred
to as the play value of an activity) that some authors associate with
the development of for example open source software (OSS) (see for
example Bitzer, Schrettl, and Schröder, 2007). The phenomenon of homo
ludens payoff indicates that individuals may have intrinsic motivation
(see for example Frey, 1997; Frey and Benz, 2005; Murdock, 2002).
In the essays IV–V (Willner and Grönblom, 2009; Grönblom and
Willner, 2013) we apply a principal-agent analysis that includes an intra-
personal game with a potential intrinsic motivation (see section 4 for
more details about intrinsic motivation).
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3.2 Creative industries
New public management and universities
The arguments that are usually presented in favour of managerialism
(stronger leadership), performance management, individual salaries and
monitoring of how the working time is allocated, are generally economic.
This thinking is related to the discussion of privatisation, in the sense
that inefficiency under public ownership is derived from the lack of high-
powered incentives (see Dixit, 1997). However, some activities cannot
be privatised. The approach that is believed to increase cost efficiency
in such cases is usually called the New Public Management (NPM) (see
Frey and Benz, 2005). Creative industries are of special interest, because
they have been affected by the NPM, despite the questionable relevance
of the assumption of no intrinsic motivation (see Frey and Benz, 2005)9.
There are several reasons why policy makers are trying to reform
creative organisations such as the universities. An ideology that sees a
reduction in public spending as an end in itself has become dominant.
The rationale for cuts in universities and other public-sector organ-
isations is partly tax competition with other countries, and partly the
notion that taxes because of high public spending reduce an individual’s
propensity to work. It is argued that the public sector, including the
universities, would become cheaper and more effective if their activity
was organised as in profit-maximising firms.
Marketisation of universities can be seen as an application of NPM
(see Lynch, 2006). In essay V (Grönblom and Willner, 2013) we analyse
marketisation (in the form of extrinsic incentives, managerialism and
redundancies) and how it might affect the performance of the university,
the work efforts, and employment.
The NPM is ultimately based on a neoliberal or Thatcherist vision
that ignores externalities or the existence of public goods. Such views
are based on the notion that all costs are allocated to the appropriate
payer, because of the alleged equality between private and social costs
and benefits. Profit maximising firms can under such conditions be
allowed to act in their self-interest, but this does not mean that other
organisations can mimic their behaviour without causing harm. The
Thatcherist vision, however, implies no room for activities that are not
self-supporting (or that are not meeting such quantitative targets that
are set for services that are not sold on a market). But public production
9Agency theory is strained in such a context also because of problems related to
multidimensional efforts (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). See below for more
details.
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is needed precisely when the social benefits overshadow the potential
customers’ willingness to pay. This means, for example, that there can
be departments within a university that may have to be cross-subsidised
by other more financially successful activities, as some departments
have lesser ability to attract external funding.
According to the thinking behind NPM, universities are in need of
sticks and carrots, because of the alleged laziness and greediness of its
employees. Allocative efficiency is usually improved in an oligopoly by
competition in the form of new entrants, but this may not be feasible in
the university sector. The budget of each departments is therefore often
linked to past performance, often in the form of degrees. Many uni-
versities have in addition implemented individual financial incentives
in the form of performance-related pay. Insofar as the state allocates
a given budget to the university sector as a whole, the system means
a zero-sum game where universities, departments and individuals are
forced to compete with each other, possibly jeopardising research co-
operation and innovation. There is also a risk that universities might
compromise quality in order to achieve higher examination targets.
A more positive inclined empirical contribution on NPM is Schubert
(2009), who analyses NPM and its efforts to increase efficiency in the
public-sector research, including universities. He admits that there
probably exists intrinsic motivation within universities. Moral hazard
may not then apply to research, but to other tasks such as for example
supervision and refereeing. However, while it may be true that NPM
can increase publishing activity, this may happen at the expense of such
tasks that involve disutility of effort.
In so far as academics are driven by a genuine interest in most of
their work assignments, the question is, can sticks and carrots then
really have a positive effect on the effort of the employee? If not, are
the costs caused by continuous performance assessment and individual
bargaining too high, and can they lead to short-termism or even reduce
intrinsic motivation?10 We address these issues in essays IV-V (Willner
and Grönblom, 2009; Grönblom and Willner, 2013), where we analyse
such organisational reforms of the university system that have taken
place in the spirit of the NPM. We argue that such reforms might be
counter-productive, because of a failure to understand the mission of
the university and the nature of the motivation of their employees.
10I discuss motivation crowding out in section 4 in more detail.
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Definition of a university
Universities are often compared to other organisations, like primary
or secondary schools, research institutes or business enterprises. But a
university is not a school, despite a strong focus on teaching. Teaching
is particularly at higher levels given by innovative and creative scholars,
who, to remain experts in their fields, should do research. A university
is not a research institute either, despite the fact that some of its research
is often commissioned by outside forces such as business enterprises
or the public sector. Ideally the researchers should be able to initiate
research without the influence of other powers in the society11. The
university should, in other words, be characterised by academic freedom.
The university is today however perceived as akin to a firm, and
the authorities try to impose control methods that are believed to be
used within business enterprises (Frey and Benz, 2005). Universities
therefore get managers who formulate performance requirements in
terms of publications and interpersonal skills, or who decide on the
prioritisation between research and teaching according to how resources
are allocated by the state and by external sponsors.
The fact that most analogies are misleading does not mean that
there are no similarities at all between univeristies and other types of
organisations. In for example knowledge-based activities, such as in
consultancy, architectural planning, hospitals, media, or performing
arts, the leader is a often a professional who not only manages but
who also participates in the actual work (Sveiby and Risling, 1986). An
editor in chief is, for example, therefore often a qualified journalist who
writes editorials, and who should be able to enjoy respect and inspire
confidence. Such activities should therefore be managed in spirit of
creative cooperation (see Sveiby and Risling, 1986).
Although universities are in some way similar to knowledge-based
companies, no university leader can be an expert in all its fields. Tra-
ditional universities are therefore characterised by collegiality, which
means that they are governed by bodies (senates, congregations and
councils on the faculty and departmental level) consisting of faculty, i.e.
of the academic staff. Such universities can therefore also be charac-
terised as producer cooperatives, like many knowledge-based private-
sector companies (see for example Glaeser, 2002; Sveiby and Risling,
1986; James and Neuberger, 1981).
The employees’ efforts are generally multidimensional in a university
and they affect the organisation’s performance either in the short or the
11Note also that it might be more challenging to attract external funding to basic than
to applied research.
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long term. Rewards and punishments based on what can be observed
in the short term might therefore lead to distortions (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1987). Payment by result and other sticks and carrots related
to observable performance measures can force employees to neglect
such essential activities that are not immediately visible in numbers of
exams.
Such problems are of course not unique just for creative industries.
Business enterprises may face similar choices. It may for example be
important for the long-run competitiveness of a firm to maintain a
department for research and development. Some American compan-
ies were in fact earlier characterised as workplaces without external
incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Jensen and Murphy, 1990)12.
Researchers are usually employees in an organisation rather than
sellers of labour hours on a competitive spot market. According to theor-
ies based on homo economicus, employees are greedy and lazy and have
to be exposed to economic incentives in order to make them perform
as desired. However, commercial firms are also employers and not just
buyers on a spot market. In other words, they are planned islands in the
market, like public-sector organisations. They are applying organisation
rather than market solutions when it comes to their own employees.
It may be argued that commercial firms are exposed to competitive
pressures that contribute to higher efforts among their employees. Such
competition might not be feasible among non-commercial organisations.
But this does not necessarily mean a lack of economic incentives, be-
cause of the competition that has always existed in such organisations,
in the form of for example competition for positions and funding.
12This seems no longer to be the case. The CEO compensation has increased rapidly
since 1995 (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).
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4 Intrinsic motivation and
motivation crowding out
4.1 Various aspects of intrinsic motivation
Intrinsic motivation for tasks and goals
The fact that economic research has drawn attention also to intrinsic
motivation means that theory now recognises that an employee can
perceive his or her organisation’s success as a driving force. This is
referred to as an goal orientation or goal identification (see for example
Frey and Benz (2005); Murdock (2002)). This means that the employee
cares about what the organisation stands for.
The employee can also find satisfaction in the work itself. This
is referred to as task involvement, in which case performing the task
provides satisfaction in itself (Frey, 1997; Fehr and Falk, Fehr and Falk;
Frey and Benz, 2005; Murdock, 2002). Effort causes in other words no
disutility. Goal identification and task involvement can also occur at
the same time, but in the essays III-IV (Willner and Grönblom, 2009;
Grönblom and Willner, 2013, 2014) we emphasise task involvement.
In essay III (Grönblom and Willner, 2014) we combine an agency
model with the established intrinsic motivation model in James (2005).
The model is otherwise compatible with standard microeconomic theory,
but does take into account intrinsic motivation. There is no uncertainty
in the model, but utility is derived from over-performing relatively to
a norm (for more details see Grönblom and Willner, 2014, p.7). The
intrinsic motivation analysis is then applied on a comparison of the
performance of public ownership and privatisation.
Empirical findings
When it comes to the production of goods and services, Minkler (2004)
finds that employees would work according to what they have agreed
with the employer even without supervision (Minkler, 2004). He ana-
lysed worker motivation in an extensive US survey. Most of his re-
spondents reported that they are very likely to work hard, even if it
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was almost impossible for their employer to monitor them. The reasons
for working hard was morale, intrinsic motivation, peer pressure, and
positive incentives (such as promotions or wage increase). The most
important of these were work morale and intrinsic motivation. Fairness
considerations were important as well, and agreements with honest em-
ployers were more likely to be honoured. This suggests that economists
might need to re-examine a fundamental assumption of the theory of
the firm (Minkler, 2004).
The respondents’ work motivation may have been exaggerated, but
these results are consistent with experimental studies that indicate that
a large proportion of individuals are characterised by reciprocity. This
means that an employee is honest and follows an agreement to make
the desired effort, provided that the employer is perceived as honest as
well (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr and Falk, Fehr and Falk).
A phenomenon which resembles reciprocity is when people who
are active in a producer cooperative (such as a university) are working
harder if they expect other employees to do so too. They might, for
example, react not as Cournot competitors, but rather by taking each
other’s reactions into account, like when there are non-zero conjectural
variations in an oligopoly. Guttman and Schnytzer (1989) use this
phenomenon to explain why Israeli kibbutzim, with no performance-
related income, have generally been more effective than Soviet collective
farms, which contrary to a common belief paid wages according to
performance (Guttman and Schnytzer, 1989).
The development of OSS, which work as a public good and is (or was)
developed freely by relatively young, motivated, and trained people
is another interesting example. The play value of such an activity is
associated to a desire to give a gift to the community (Bitzer, Schrettl,
and Schröder, 2007)13. Software developers’ work rarely provide any
significant economic payoff, so the economic motive cannot be signific-
ant. The driving force is rather the ambition to address the lack of good
software and make it freely available.
An internet-based questionnaire conducted by Hertel, Niedner, and
Herrmann (2003) on the motivation of 141 software developers within
a large OSS-project (the Linux kernel) shows similar results and sug-
gest that the participants’ involvement was determined especially by
their identification as Linux developers and by pragmatic motives to
improve their own software. Part of the software development was
13While it is desirable that certain goods and services are offered as public goods
without a profit motive, it is often the case that key sectors in a society cannot be
based entirely on volunteer work. Non-profit organisations that pay a reasonable
wage are therefore also needed.
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achieved in teams. The activity of these teams was determined by the
participants’ evaluation of the team goals as well as by their perceived
indispensability and self-efficacy. This kind of behaviour indicates
intrinsic motivation.
Drawbacks of intrinsic motivation
The presence of intrinsic motivation suggests that shirking may be a less
significant problem than suggested by traditional theory, even in profit
maximising business enterprises. But these results can be important
especially from the standpoint of academic work, insofar as intrinsic
motivation is even more prominent within creative professions. How-
ever, intrinsic motivation may not always be experienced as beneficial by
the employer. Intrinsically motivated employees are often opinionated.
Those who are committed to their work can sometimes be perceived as
more difficult to handle than those who are driven solely by economic
incentives, and whose loyalty has a price (Frey, 1997).
Intrinsic motivation can, however, make employees vulnerable in
particular in profit maximising firms. The employer might abuse such
employees by investing less in labour-related costs and more in other
activities, in the hope that the employee remains intrinsically motivated.
This might occur if efforts are partly substitutable and if the employee
cares for the output (Glazer, 2004)14. This might also be the case in a
non-profit maximising organisation that is forced to reduce its costs, for
example if it is affected by the NPM. In other words, intrinsic motivation
can leave the employees exploited by paying lower wages or no wages
at all, while they are expected to complete their tasks anyway (Glazer,
2004; Willner and Grönblom, 2006).
4.2 Motivation crowding out: potential causes and
effects
Sticks and carrots and other reasons for motivation crowding
out
While economic incentives can improve employee performance in the
right context (Prendergast, 1999), they can also crowd out intrinsic
motivation or reduce the employee’s performance (Frey, 1997; Fehr and
Falk, Fehr and Falk; Minkler, 2004). It was earlier believed that the
presence of intrinsic motivation would cause no fundamental change
14The motivated employees wage is decreased when their effort is increased.
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to an agency model. For example Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
argue that intrinsic motivation does not matter as long as the employer
wants higher effort than what is optimal for the worker15. However, the
presence of potential intrinsic motivation matters if it is incompatible
with high-powered incentives16.
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) take into account mechanisms that cause
such motivation crowding out (MCO), by assuming that employees have
incomplete information about their own abilities and the requirement
level of their tasks. They can partly be influenced by payments, but also
by the manner in which the employer interferes in their work assign-
ments. Such factors affect the employees’ self-image and perception of
the nature of their tasks, and hence their self-confidence, which has been
shown to affect their intrinsic motivation (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002).
Employers often have a vested interest in their employees carrying
out tasks successfully, and can therefore manipulate information so as to
improve their self-confidence (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). A sufficiently
high wage that is fixed and unrelated to performance can be a way to
signal trust, which in turn reinforces employee motivation. However,
the employer can also use rewards and punishments to make a task
seem less desirable. This might encourage efforts in the short term, but
the rewards and punishments reduce the willingness to exert efforts
voluntarily in medium term. According to Bénabou and Tirole (2003),
such a leadership style might be a part of a power struggle in which the
employer deliberately tries to undermine the employees’ self-esteem (i.e.
ego-bashing), perhaps in order to make the employees easier to control.
The employer may, for example, fail to communicate crucial information
or belittle the employee by undervaluing the perception of his or her
tasks or duties. In the first case, the damage can be repaired if the agent
receives the crucial information later, but the damage is irreversible in
the latter case (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003).
When it comes to activities within creative industries such as research,
visual arts, writing, and performing arts where material incentives are
not in the foreground, employees might be subdued by exposure to
sticks and carrots. Their pride might get wounded when perceiving
themselves as manipulated. Insofar as intrinsic motivation is seen as
linked to a propensity for trouble-making, leaders might be tempted
15The workers’ optimal effort would be k1k2 if the utility of effort is of the form u =
k1e − 12 k2e2, where k stands for disutility of effort, and e for efforts, and where
k1 and k2 are positive parameters. Noting essential changes in the agency model
provided that the employer desires an effort that is higher than k1k2 .
16There might also be an upper limit of effort that can not be exceeded. I do not discuss
this in this dissertation, but the issue is important for future research.
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to reform their organisation in a way that would crowd out intrinsic
motivation, to make the organisation and its employees easier to control
(see Frey, 1997). Therefore, to introduce sticks and carrots might be part
of adapting the organisation to new goals, by making the employees feel
manipulated and indifferent to their work (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003).
Bearing in mind the pitfalls of using false analogies, it neverthe-
less seems that universities and other organisations within creative
industries might learn something from the business community as well.
According to Deming (1993), there are four effective ways to kill a busi-
ness enterprise: [1] by introducing competition among staff and between
different departments; [2] by using rewards and punishments according
to performances criteria that are difficult or impossible to measure; [3]
by humiliating the personnel; [4] by creating fear. These methods would
destroy job satisfaction and motivation (Deming, 1993).
In essays III–IV (Grönblom and Willner, 2014; Willner and Grön-
blom, 2009; Grönblom and Willner, 2013) we analyse models where
performance-related pay can cause MCO. Insofar as there is strong
intrinsic motivation in universities, economic incentives might be at best
unnecessary (see Willner and Grönblom, 2009; Grönblom and Willner,
2013). In essay V (Grönblom and Willner, 2013) we treat MCO as similar
to alienation, i.e. estrangement from work, task or duties. Note however
also the counterintuitive results that are reached in the more conven-
tional models of essays I–II (Grönblom and Willner, 2008; Willner and
Grönblom, 2012)
Red tape
Employees in creative organisations tend to be involved in some neces-
sary administrative duties, in addition to their proper work assignments.
For example, collegial governance in universities involves senates, con-
gregations, faculty councils, and departmental councils that are mostly
composed of representatives of the academic staff. Other examples are
curriculum planning and appointment decisions.
A rationale for managerialism has often been to streamline the
decision-making and hence to reduce bureaucracy or red tape, but
it seems that universities and other public-sector organisations have
in fact become more bureaucratic by managerialism. For example, the
reform activity in universities over the past two decades in Finland has
meant less time for research and teaching, and an increasing number
administrative tasks and administrators (see for example Professorit
and Tieteentekijät, 2010).
25
i
i
“avhandlingen” — 2014/9/16 — 15:48 — page 26 — #36 i
i
i
i
i
i
Some red tape, such as time monitoring (”work-time allocation”), is
imposed by external funders, such as the EU. However, if researchers
are already working as much as they are able to, reporting and mon-
itoring do not provide any value-added in the form of higher efforts,
but can instead reduce the time for research, teaching and necessary
administration. Such bureaucracy might also contribute to MCO, or
at least to a feeling that the work has lost its meaning (Grönblom and
Willner, 2009; Willner and Grönblom, 2006).
Fat cats
The label fat cats is generally used for, among others, managers enjoying
bonuses and/or salaries and/or fringe benefits that are perceived as
conspicuously high. These top executives also receive generous pensions
and retirement packages, consisting of extra compensation not available
to other company employees17. Such compensations can represent IRC,
but fat-cat salaries that are sky-rocketing because of MCO also lead to
genuine inefficiency, because of higher costs than without MCO.
The fact that NPM means mimicking alleged private-sector practices
has attracted criticism in light of fat-cat salaries and other benefits that
are unrelated to actual performance, or scandals such as the Enron-case
(see Frey and Benz, 2005), but also recent stock-market crashes.
Earlier agency models of privatisation have not explained the fat-
cat phenomenon18. The same is true with models that take potential
intrinsic motivation into account. We find in Essay III (Grönblom and
Willner, 2014) that fat-cat salaries can occur when a company in public
ownership with intrinsic motivation and a fixed wage is privatised. The
fat-cat salary is then a result of MCO, performance-related wages and a
lower effort after privatisation.
17For a definition see for example Investopedia (2014). For studies on fat cats see for
example Cammett (2005).
18Earlier agency models suggest that salaries would increase after privatisation and the
introduction of performance-related pay, but this can be seen as an efficiency wage.
The higher salary because of MCO is on the other hand a source of inefficiency.
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5 Overview of the Essays
5.1 Essay I: Privatization and liberalization: costs
and benefits in the presence of wage-bargaining
One of the main economic motives for privatisation and liberalisation is
to reduce costs that are believed to be higher in a public monopoly. Ex-
amples of mechanisms that are believed to lead to higher costs are based
on internal rent capture (Robinson, 2003; Bradburd, 1995; Bradburd,
Pugel, and Pugh, 1991), interference from self-interested politicians
(Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996), and managerial inefficiency (Vick-
ers and Yarrow, 1988). However, lower cost efficiency is not equivalent
to lower welfare as expressed by the total surplus. The question is
then whether higher costs overshadow the possible benefits of public
ownership.
In this essay we analyse the welfare changes caused by privatisation
and liberalisation when there is wage bargaining. Privatisation and
liberalisation are then assumed to mean that welfare maximisation is
replaced by profit maximisation in a Cournot-oligopoly with a given
number of firms or with free-entry and in the presence of sunk costs.
We also analyse the case of vertical separation. There is some amount
of internal rent capture (IRC) both before and after privatisation and
liberalisation. The model can be applied on labour intensive firms
and organisations, such as in the service sector, but also on industrial
production and infrastructure industries.
We find that wages after liberalisation will in most cases decrease, but
not because of privatisation as such. Competition has a stronger impact
on costs than ownership. Social welfare may increase after liberalisation
with decentralised wage bargaining and free entry, if the employees’
bargaining power is high, and if there is no need for vertical separation.
The social costs of privatisation and liberalisation are more likely to
dominate if sunk costs are high in the case of free entry, and will always
dominate if there is central wage bargaining or if liberalisation requires
vertical separation.
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5.2 Essay II: Reforming a network industry:
consequences for cost efficiency and welfare
Network industries such as electricity, gas, telecommunications and
railways usually have an upstream natural monopoly infrastructure.
Competition in such an industry cannot be achieved without vertical
separation. Because of the benefits of vertical integration, vertical separ-
ation with liberalisation does not necessarily increase welfare, even if
marginal costs are reduced. To increase welfare, the cost reductions have
to overshadow the drawbacks of separation, such as excessive network
charges and double marginalisation.
In this essay we analyse the social costs and benefits of restructur-
ing a network industry trough vertical separation, privatisation and
downstream competition when potential cost differences are caused
by managerial inefficiency rather than IRC (contrary to the focus of
essay I). We ask whether the downstream activity really becomes more
cost efficient, but we extend the analysis to upstream cost efficiency as
well. We approach cost efficiency using an agency model.
We find that such a restructuring of a network industry generally
reduces welfare. It turns out that market entry lead to higher marginal
costs and to ambiguous welfare effects in the presence of a downstream
agency problem. Even a profit-maximising monopoly is superior to
vertical separation and competition in such an industry. A welfare
maximising vertically integrated monopoly is the most cost effective
solution, which also provides the highest welfare. Market entry on the
other hand reduces marginal costs and enhances welfare if the agency
problem occurs upstream, but the results are otherwise similar.
5.3 Essay III: Organisational form and individual
motivation: public ownership, privatisation and
fat cats
As discussed earlier, employees (including managers) may not be driven
only by a desire to get high payments and to exert low efforts. They may
also be driven by intrinsic motivation and this can affect the welfare
comparison. In this essay we focus on the case of intrinsic motivation,
mainly in the form of task involvement (see for example Frey, 1997;
Fehr and Falk, Fehr and Falk; Frey and Benz, 2005; Murdock, 2002).
However, an employee may also be driven by goal orientation or goal
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identification (see for example Frey and Benz, 2005; Murdock, 2002). We
consider this possibility in an extension.
We have industrial companies and the service sector in mind, but
not organisations within creative industries (contrary to our focus in
essays IV-V). Like in essay II, we apply agency analysis on public
and private ownership, comparing costs and welfare under different
regimes. But in this set-up we combine intrinsic motivation as modelled
by James (2005) with an agency model. Employees then derive utility
from overperforming relative to a social norm or target. Motivation
crowding out (MCO) can occur if these are too high or too stringent,
because it might then become impossible to overperform.
Conventional agency theory suggests that private ownership outper-
forms public ownership if wages are performance-related only in the
former (it would follow for example from De Fraja, 1993). However, as
explained in more detail in this essay, the ranking is reversed if both
types of firms have performance-based pay. By contrast, we find that
the possibility of intrinsic motivation and MCO can cause perform-
ance differences in both directions. Fat-cat salaries can occur if public
ownership with intrinsic motivation and a fixed salary is followed by
privatisation, performance-related pay, a lower effort, and MCO. We can
conclude that no market structure nor ownership form is then superior
under all circumstances. Other factors than ownership, such as how the
employers handle motivation, can therefore have a greater impact on
performance. The analysis also mentions factors that might influence
the outcome of a particular type of organisation. For example, firms
with wider objectives might be more likely to attract motivated workers.
A high level of demand would also lead to higher intrinsic motivation.
5.4 Essay IV: The impact of budget cuts and
incentive wages on academic work
In this and the next essay we proceed to analyse the academic world,
assuming potential intrinsic motivation among its employees, as this
is a reasonable assumption in creative industries. In recent years, uni-
versities have in most countries been exposed to a series of reforms
that are supposed to address their alleged inefficiency. In the same
way as in public-sector organisations in general, inefficiency is generally
believed to be explained by a lack of high powered incentives (Dixit,
1997). Performance-based pay is then often justified by the notion that
agents would not make sufficient efforts if their salary is fixed. Ac-
cording to the New Public Management (NPM), universities should
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resemble private firms as much as possible (Newberry and Pallot, 2004;
Hood, 1995)19. NPM has usually meant budget cuts, auditing, top-down
management and hence lost professional autonomy, user charges (or
vouchers), accountability for performance, management with an em-
phasis on economic incentives, and an erosion of tenure (see for example
Gruening, 2001; Hood, 1995; Schimank, 2005). However, such reforms
might not work as expected insofar as employers in creative industries
do not conform to the assumptions of public-choice theory and agency
theory.
In this essay we include intrinsic motivation in the form of task
involvement into the utility function. We introduce intrinsic motivation
as one side of the employee with a multiple self (see for example Elster,
1986; Schelling, 1980, 1983). One side is then assumed to be intrinsically
motivated, whereas the other appreciates income and low efforts, like
homo economicus. We then ask what kind of environment gives the
intrinsic motivation the upper hand. We ask in particular whether
intrinsic motivation can survive if employees are exposed to for example
red tape, budget cuts, and extrinsic rewards and punishments.
It turns out that a fixed salary may under reasonable conditions (for
example when the intrinsic motivation is strong) lead to higher creative
efforts and a higher output per worker. We also find that budget cuts or
output funding can reduce the effort. Performance-based pay leads to
motivation crowding out if the salary is approaching the threshold level
for quitting.
5.5 Essay V: Marketization and alienation in
academic activity
This final essay is a book chapter in which we analyse the impact of
marketisation of a university on work motivation, employment and
performance. Marketisation represents an attempt to improve economic
performance, by adopting private-sector principles on the public sector
and on non-profit organisations (see for example Lynch, 2006). It is
believed that marketisation would strengthen customer orientation and
cost awareness (see for example Jongbloed, 2003). Only few studies
have seriously questioned the benefits of such reforms by applying
microeconomics.
In this essay we analyse how marketisation affects the perform-
ance of a university, by including potential intrinsic motivation in a
19In the US, the same phenomenon is referred to as the corporatisation of universities
(Scheuerman and Kriger, 2004).
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principal-agent model in a similar way as in essay IV. We ask whether
marketisation in the form of budget cuts, extrinsic rewards and pun-
ishment, as well as managerialism and eroded tenure, might lead to
alienation in the sense of MCO. We ask whether these kinds of reforms
would affect effort and employment, and in particular whether a leader
with a strong position as consistent with managerialism would prefer
employees with stronger or weaker intrinsic motivation.
The analysis suggests that rewards and punishments can be effective
if the intrinsic motivation is weak, but otherwise they just lead to MCO.
There is also MCO if the participation constraint is binding, because
the employee then works as if without intrinsic motivation. The in-
troduction of managerialism results in cost-cutting efforts, instead of
a focus on the university’s main tasks. The administration is more
expensive because of increased top salaries. The leader would prefer
employees with weaker intrinsic motivation and a possibility to make
redundancies, because of rewards that are given for cost-cutting actions.
Weaker intrinsic motivation can be achieved by increasing those tasks
for which the employee has weak intrinsic motivation, such as bureau-
cracy or changes in the working environment. On the other hand, if
the participation constraint is not binding, the wage would increase
depending on the strength of the workers intrinsic motivation. We
also find that there is a possibility that marketisation can erode the
tenure system indirectly, because of the higher budget proportion that
goes to the top-management salaries. The leader might also hire fewer
employees with high intrinsic motivation or low disutility of effort after
marketisation.
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6 Concluding remarks and future
research
My essays on privatisation and liberalisation challenge conventional
views about how industrial production and infrastructure industries
should be organised. The findings might be summarised as suggesting
that no form of organisation is superior under all circumstances when
it comes to cost performance and social welfare (see for example essay
I, II and III).
My essays on universities and creative industries are not just about
industries where privatisation and entry might not be feasible (see
for example essays IV–V). Universities are interesting also because it
has been suggested that traditional universities and other public-sector
organisations can serve as role models also for the business community.
Frey and Benz (2005) mention thorough and fair selection processes,
career paths that discourage opportunists, employee autonomy within
given rules, fixed-term leadership assignments, and restrictions on
re-election and other constraints for the Executive Committee. They
particularly emphasise that the intrinsic motivation should be supported
by non-economic means of recognition and by fixed wages, to be able
to avoid disagreements related to monitoring and measuring of the
employees’ performance (Frey and Benz, 2005).
The importance of a fair and transparent reward system cannot be
emphasised enough. It is also essential for the motivated employee to be
appreciated, and not rewarded exclusively through monetary benefits
(and sometimes not even that), when the goals are reached. A system
with a fixed salary, where all the workers know about the rules of the
game, can provide a relaxing atmosphere for demanding work assign-
ments and for striving towards common goals. The only way to get a
higher wage is then to advance along the career ladder. A seemingly
performance-based system that involves individual negotiations that
will not affect the wages after all can on the other hand be perceived
as frustrating and unjust. This might happen if the organisation cannot
afford any increases, if the employer is out of touch with the employees’
work assignments, or if wages have a ceiling and a floor. Such seemingly
performance-based wages might encourage shirking and competition
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among staff. It might also crowd out the intrinsic motivation (see for
example essay IV and V).
Universities should promote creativity. Insofar as sticks and carrots
do not work, other mechanisms should be used to encourage creativity.
Dialogues between research teams, and with department management
might enhance motivation (Philipson, 1990). The ability of senior staff to
set an example for younger colleagues might also be utilised more often
(Lagerkvist, 1990). To experience repeated reforms and a constant ques-
tioning of the university’s right to exist is on the other hand tiresome,
as is such competition that undermines fruitful cooperation between
individuals and departments. The analysis in essays IV-V suggests that
creativity should therefore be promoted through an open discussion
climate rather than through sticks and carrots (see also for example
Grönblom and Willner, 2009; Willner and Grönblom, 2006).
My analysis also suggests a number of future research questions. For
example, it might be useful to extend the analysis to differential goods,
for example in the case of Bertrand competition. Moreover, it would
be interesting to analyse a potential trade-off between measures that
decrease asymmetric information between management and employ-
ees (such as monitoring) and measures that strengthen the employee’s
intrinsic motivation. It would also be interesting to analyse how organ-
isations that rely on different types of motivation compete against each
other.
Another interesting future project would be to link the study of
intrinsic motivation to Maslow’s hierarchies of needs. I would ask
what needs that have to be met before an organisation can rely on the
employee’s need of self-fulfilment or intrinsic motivation. In particular,
would higher insecurity, which may work as part of a high-powered
incentive scheme, crowd out the intrinsic motivation, which comes
higher up in the hierarchy of needs?
I would also like to perform an empirical study of the problems
of management in public and private companies in particular when
it comes to potential intrinsic motivation. Self-selection is another
interesting issue. What kind of workers are likely to be hired by the
public respective private sector, and who is attracted by self-employment
(see for example Christofides and Pashardes, 2002)?
When it comes to universities, it would be interesting to analyse
how career predictability affects the gender balance. Would a US-style
tenure-track for example imply a disadvantage for women? Other topics
of interest that are missing from this dissertation are wider objectives
that relate to more than the consumer surplus. The status of women can
for example be included among the organisation’s objectives (see for
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example Stinson, 2004; Zetterberg, 1992). For example, Miettinen (2000)
finds that wider objectives, including consumer welfare and gender
balance, mattered among Finnish state-owned companies in the late 80s
and in the 90s. The previous literature also suggest that privatisation
may have implications for several socially relevant questions, including
gender issues.
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In this dissertation I analyse private and public-sec-
tor firms and organisations, including universities, 
in particular in the presence of potential intrinsic 
motivation. I deal with both industrial productions, 
including infrastructure industries with vertical rela-
tions, and service provision, and in particular in the 
case of universities. Costs may differ across firms or 
organisations in both types of industries because 
of, for example, internal rent capture and agency 
problems. I also ask whether there are other factors 
than ownership and competition, such as the ap-
proach to employee motivation that may affect the 
performance of commercial firms and non-profit 
organisations.   When it comes to public services, I 
also analyse the rationale behind public-sector re-
forms and the impact of these reforms on organisa-
tional performance and social welfare, with an em-
phasis on the so-called New Public Management. I 
deliberately use and amend models with standard 
components such as Cournot oligopoly, Nash bar-
gaining and constant absolute risk aversion.
